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Abstract We examine how Anglo-American capital market logic penetrated
into Singapore where relational logic tends to guide business activities and illus-
trate how domestic banks reacted to this imported logic in the corporate governance
ﬁeld. We argue that the banks’ ability to accommodate competing logics was
enhanced by state agencies’ willingness to modify Anglo-American standards to ﬁt
the local context. Given the resulting institutional ambiguities in rules, local banks,
while incorporating higher outside representation on their boards, reinterpreted the
meaning of independence and emphasized the resource provision role rather than
the monitoring function of outside directors. The resultant institutional change has
been gradual.
Asian Business & Management (2015) 14, 91–115. doi:10.1057/abm.2015.1;
published online 4 March 2015
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Introduction
Many Asian nations have been becoming increasingly integrated into the global
economy and subjected to external pressures to conform to neoliberal market-led
practices with respect to economic and corporate governance. Asian ﬁrms were
severely critiqued for having failed to monitor and check the omnipotent power of
controlling families or predatory states, which led to the Asian ﬁnancial crisis of
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1997. Eventually, Anglo-American capital market logic and its associated corporate
governance structures were imported as gold standards (Kim and Lee, 2012) and
enacted as regulations or codes. Although the content of these national regulations
and codes vary, their prescriptions are similar, with aims to enhance the monitoring
role of outside directors, ensure accountability to shareholders and protect investors,
especially minority shareholders (Aguilera and Cuervo-Cazurra, 2004). These have
generated signiﬁcant institutional pressures for corporate governance change in
various nations.
Singapore has environmental conditions similar to a number of other Asian
newly industrialized and emerging economies. Hence, it is a highly relevant
case for studying corporate governance change in such economies. Singapore
is characterized as ‘open state-led capitalism’ (Carney, 2014), having a high
degree of dependence on global trade and ﬁnance, a legacy of an activist state,
low levels of minority shareholder activism (Gourevitch and Shinn, 2005),
and substantial inﬂuence from Anglo-American corporate governance principles
and structures. Singapore’s context also makes it relevant for examining the
contest between the Anglo-American capital market and local relational logics, as
such conﬂict is especially acute because of Singapore’s small size and economic
openness.
In this article, we examine the penetration of Anglo-American capital market logic
into the local market of Singapore and domestic banks’ actions in managing this
imported logic and the local relational logic. We focus on the appointment of
independent directors, because this is the most contentious issue in corporate
governance not only in Singapore, but also in other Asian economies (CLSA,
2004). Speciﬁcally, we discuss how in their attempt to make the country a global
ﬁnancial hub without causing major disruptions in the local market context, different
state agencies in Singapore have modiﬁed Anglo-American standards regarding the
appointment of independent directors to suit the local context. This creates much
room for local banking groups to claim compliance, but effectively take advantage of
‘institutional ambiguity’ (Jackson, 2005) to exploit the multi-dimensionality of board
directors’ roles, emphasizing the resource provision role of independent directors,
and downplaying their monitoring function. Subsequently, institutional change has
emerged based on state agencies’ promotion of Anglo-American standards and ﬁrms’
compliance, though coupled with a reinterpretation of the imported institution to
protect their existing interests.
The remainder of this article is composed of four sections. First, we outline the
theoretical framework. Second, we describe the research design, data collection, and
analysis process. Next, we identify the Singapore context and analyze how, in light of
imported versus local institutional logics, state agencies enacted recommendations
and rules that in turn triggered ﬁrm responses and institutional change. Lastly, we
summarize the theoretical contributions of the study, and implications for policy and
practice as well as future research directions.
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Theoretical Framework
Revisiting the convergence–divergence debate on institutional change
Agency theory suggests that convergence to the Anglo-American model is inevitable
because of the competitive pressures from market-led neoliberal processes amid
intensifying economic globalization (Coffee, 1999; Hansmann and Kraakman,
2001). It is argued that any inefﬁcient system will eventually lose out in a competitive
marketplace.
However, contrary to agency theory predictions, most Asian ﬁrms have not in
actual practice converged to Anglo-American models (Ahmadjian and Song, 2007;
Yoshikawa et al, 2007). Speciﬁcally, Walter (2008) refutes the convergence
argument on ‘regulatory neoliberalism’ and identiﬁes signiﬁcant gaps between
substantive and cosmetic compliance with Anglo-American best practices in South
Korea, Thailand, Indonesia, and Malaysia. On the basis of a comparison of eight
Asian economies, Walter and Zhang (2012, p. 248) argue that despite the emergence
of organizational diversities, ‘national systems of capitalism in the region remain
both distinctively East Asian and retain important continuities with the past’.
Ownership and control of ﬁrms remains strongly held by states and/or politically
favored families. Nations’ ﬁnancial systems ‘bear little structural resemblance to the
ﬁnancial architecture of the United States, a prototype of market-centered ﬁnancial
capitalism’ (Walter and Zhang, 2012, p. 255). On the basis of a political-economy
perspective, they argue that domestic politics matter and explain how governments
cope with regulatory neoliberals versus domestic pressure groups.
Arriving at a similar conclusion, theorists from the varieties-of-capitalism
approach argue that divergence will likely remain because of path dependence,
institutional resiliency, comparative institutional advantages and/or sufﬁcient
systemic ﬂexibility to shield domestic systems from external pressure (Orrú et al,
1997; Hall and Soskice, 2001).
Although agreeing with the literature rejecting the convergence perspective,
Streeck and Thelen (2005) critique its conservative bias. They argue that it lacks
analytical tools to depict institutional change in various economies and hence
understates the extent and signiﬁcance of change. In their view, gradual institutional
change can be fundamental and transformative, without dramatic disruptions.
Institutions as regimes: Rule makers and rule takers
We draw on an institutional perspective in our analysis because it is particularly
useful in addressing institutional continuity and change on corporate governance.
Unlike agency theory and the convergence perspective, which anchor on context-free
agency, economic rationality, efﬁciency and utility maximization, unrestricted
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information ﬂow, natural evolution, and one-size-ﬁts-all solutions, the institutional
perspective is suited to integrating complexity (Djelic, 2010), taking into account the
inﬂuence of market, cultural, and institutional forces in shaping institutional change
and continuity (Orrú et al, 1997).
Djelic (2010) succinctly highlighted that under the broad label of ‘institutional-
ism’, there is also a fair amount of diversity. Disregarding disciplinary, conceptual
and geographical divides, the main argument from an institutional perspective is that
organizations need to observe laws, rules and norms that are taken for granted in their
environment in order to gain legitimacy.
Deﬁning institutions so generally as to cover all forms of normative regulations
over social action would make our study too broad to be meaningful. Hence, we
adopt Streeck and Thelen’s conceptualization of institutions as formalized rules,
conﬁning our analysis to formal legal- political institutions rather than informal
‘anthropological’ ones. Following these authors, we deﬁne an institution as a regime:
‘a set of rules stipulating expected behavior and ‘‘ruling out’’ behavior deemed to be
undesirable’ (2005, pp 12–13). In a regime, there are rule-makers and rule-takers
whose relations and interactions are often critical for the content and development of
the regime. The gaps between them create room for strategic action on the part of the
rule-takers.
Streeck and Thelen (2005) argue that applying a general rule to a speciﬁc context
constitutes a creative act, which must take unique conditions into consideration.
Rules are likely to vary with time and circumstance, which may allow ﬂexibility for
rule-takers in applying them. Rule-takers do not simply observe rules imposed on
them, but often attempt to revise them by exploiting their inherent ambiguities and
under-deﬁnition. In situations where rules demand costly and uncomfortable
obligations, rule-takers often attempt to circumvent them by exploiting loopholes.
In such an interpretive struggle, rule-takers may evade or subvert rules to their
advantage. Institutions are thus perceived as a continuous interaction between rule-
makers and rule-takers, during which new interpretations of rules will emerge. Thus,
any resultant institutional change may be unpredictable.
Institutional change and logic clash
The process of institutional change is complex, as competing institutional logics
often coexist. Various authors observe that multiple fragmented environments can
impose uncoordinated demands on organizations (D’Aunno et al, 1991), which
subsequently have to confront conﬂicting and changing expectations of powerful
external actors (Elsbach and Sutton, 1992).
The varied institutional expectations anchored on different institutional logics
were ﬁrst captured by Friedland and Alford’s (1991) idea of multiple competing
institutional logics generating inconsistent expectations. The notion of logic refers to
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‘broader cultural beliefs and rules that structure cognition and guide decision-making
in a ﬁeld’ (Lounsbury, 2007, p. 289). Institutional logics, as overarching principles,
guide actors on how to interpret organizational reality, behave in social situations and
succeed in the social world (Friedland and Alford, 1991). Often, organizations
encounter institutional complexity when they face conﬂicting prescriptions from
contending institutional logics, and hence they unavoidably confront challenges and
tensions in institutional change processes (Greenwood et al, 2011).
Streeck and Thelen (2005) proposed ﬁve types of gradual institutional change with
corresponding mechanisms. The ﬁrst is displacement, which indicates a rise in the
salience of foreign practices at the expense of traditional institutions used to impose a
dominant logic of action. The mechanism to achieve this is through defection by an
increasing number of actors to the new imported institutions. The second is layering,
which refers to an attachment of new elements to existing institutions, gradually
leading to a compromise between the old and the new, and eventually leading to the
defeat of the old. This is prompted by differential growth between the old and new
institutions. The third is conversion, whereby rule-takers take advantage of institu-
tional ambiguity (Jackson, 2005) in rules, especially when competing logics are at
work, to reinterpret old institutions to serve new purposes. Next is drift, where
deliberate neglect generates a neglect of institutional maintenance despite external
environmental change, leading to slippage in institutional practices. The last is
exhaustion, whereby a gradual breakdown of institutions takes place over time.
According to Streeck and Thelen (2005, p. 29), ‘different from institutional drift, in
which institutions may retain their formal integrity even as they increasingly lose
their grip on social reality, institutional exhaustion is a process in which behaviors
invoked or allowed under existing rules operate to undermine these’.
How do we conceptualize institutional change versus resilience in relation to
corporate governance in an open economy such as Singapore? Is institutional change
incremental and yet fundamental, as Streeck and Thelen (2005) perceived, and how
do we characterize the change? Or is institutional resilience prevalent, as Walter and
Zhang (2012) argued? Our empirical research aimed to address these questions.
Research Methods
This study examines the extent of institutional change versus resilience in an open
economy in Asia through an analysis of the responses of Singapore state agencies
and domestic banks to competing institutional logics in the ﬁeld of corporate
governance. We chose a case study design, because it allows us to gain, through
contextualization, a deeper qualitative understanding of governance reforms and
responses from major players in the economy (Miles and Huberman, 1994).
Our empirical exploration shows that state agencies and large ﬁrms play a more
direct role in inﬂuencing the debate on corporate governance in Singapore than other
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actors, and we thus identify them as central to our analysis. Clegg (1981) emphasizes
that the state structures the space in which organizations operate by devising,
enacting and enforcing rules. Its resources are fought over and won among
corporations. Speciﬁc state interventions have speciﬁc effects at speciﬁc levels of
organizational practice. This conceptualization directs our attention to the actions of
two key state agencies, the Ministry of Finance (MOF) and the Monetary Authority
of Singapore (MAS), in shaping corporate governance reforms.
As for commercial organizations, we focus on all three domestic banking groups
(which own six locally incorporated full banks) for two reasons. First, the banks
operate in a global industry because of an increasingly free ﬂow of capital around the
world, and yet are subjected to a high degree of state intervention through
regulations. This implies that banks are under strong pressure to comply with the
Anglo-American capital market logic that the state aims to foster. However, the
domestic market is dominated by government-linked corporations and large family-
controlled ﬁrms, which are embedded in the local institutional logic.
Second, these three banking groups are Singapore’s largest companies by total
assets, and appeared in the 2011 Financial Times Global 500 Listing of the world’s
top companies by market value. According to Greenwood et al (2011), visible and
high-status organizations often occupy a central position in the ﬁeld, being more
deeply embedded and highly exposed to tensions between competing logics than
peripheral organizations. Hence, a study of these largest companies enables us to
explore complex responses from heavily embedded ﬁrms to competing logics and the
subsequent institutional change in the corporate governance ﬁeld.
The Development Bank of Singapore (DBS), the largest of the three, was founded
by the government in 1969 as a government-linked corporation for development
ﬁnancing. Until the Asian ﬁnancial crisis of 1997, its board was ﬁlled largely by ex-
civil servants. The second largest bank, the Overseas Chinese Banking Corporation
(OCBC), was incorporated as a limited company in 1932. The owning family
eventually relinquished the posts of CEO and board chair in 1999 and 2003,
respectively, to managers recruited from the external labor market (Koh, 2001).
However, the smallest of the three, the United Overseas Bank (UOB), established in
1935 as the United Chinese Bank (retaining its name until 1965), has remained
tightly controlled and run by the largest shareholder’s family.
Data sources and collection
Our study relied on both personal interviews and documentary research. Starting
from 2005, we collected documentary data for an extended period of 15 years from
1997 (the year in which the Asian ﬁnancial crisis occurred) to 2012. We sourced data
through local, regional and international media reports, annual reports and press
releases issued by all relevant entities, including the banks, state economic agencies,
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professional associations, and corporate governance watchdogs. In particular, 474
media reports in both English and Chinese were sourced from major local, regional
and international media agencies. All published materials concerning institutional
and ﬁrm-level analyses formed part of our data and simultaneously provided us with
a basis on which to develop three interview guides for personal interviews.
Personal interviews were conducted in three phases. In the ﬁrst phase, from 2005
to 2006, we conducted informal interviews with informants to help determine the
scope of the study and to obtain referrals to the most appropriate respondents. The
second phase, from 2007 to 2009, consisted of corporate visits, collection of
documentary materials, and formal interviews with bank directors, senior executives,
government ofﬁcials and members of professional associations (see Table 1). In the
last phrase (2010–2012), we conducted interviews with academics and other
professionals in the ﬁeld.
We used interview guides based on semi-structured questions that allowed us to
collect open-ended narrative data in addition to factual information. These interviews
were carried out primarily in English (with the supplementation of Mandarin and
Chinese dialects). We guaranteed the anonymity of respondents throughout the
interview process to promote candor. We enforced a detailed interview protocol and
set transcription standards to address the issue of reliability. In accordance with
informant preference, the interviews were either taped or recorded in writing and then
transcribed within 24 hours. The interviews lasted from 1 to 3 hours. To exercise
control over data validation, we triangulated the interview data with data from other
sources (Yin, 2003). These procedures enabled us to verify at least some of the data
Table 1: Background of the respondents
Field Category Number of
interviewees




Members of Singapore Institute of Directors 8
Members of public service agencies 15
Members of international bodies 2




Media (board directors) 1
Corporate Senior managers 3
Board directors 13
Chairpersons of boards and board committees 12
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on corporate governance reform measures and the views of board members and
senior managers on such measures.
Data analysis
We conducted a content analysis of the data through an iterative interpretative
approach of moving between data and literature to develop a coherent explanation
(Tsui-Auch and Moellering, 2010). The analysis encompassed three stages. First, we
undertook a line-by-line analysis of all the transcripts and published materials to
ensure a thorough understanding of respondents’ meanings (Battilana and Dorado,
2010) and to extract factual data. Second, we clustered data around the global and
local forces, state actions on corporate governance reforms, and ﬁrm responses. This
data-clustering exercise (Nag et al, 2007) enabled us to identify emergent organiza-
tional responses and their underlying conditions. In the third stage of analysis, we
focused on a dialog between data and explanations (Eisenhardt and Graebner, 2007).
We constantly revisited our tentative explanations when responses at both institu-
tional and ﬁrm levels emerged and when the underlying conditions and actors’
intentions were revealed. Iterating between theory and data, we developed a
comprehensive analysis.
Case Study Results
The institutional environment in Singapore
Global economic embeddedness
After independence in 1965, the Singaporean government aimed to foster economic
development, reduce unemployment and strengthen social control in order to sustain
its political rule. To speed up economic modernization and to create employment, the
state adopted a ‘two-legged’ policy that relied on multinational corporations and
government-linked corporations for industrialization. On the one hand, it enticed
multinational corporations to establish manufacturing operations. On the other, being
inspired by Japan’s horizontal corporate groups and South Korea’s chaebol, the
government created large government-linked corporations. These corporations are
entities of which at least an equity interest of 20 per cent is held by a holding
company wholly owned by the Singaporean government, such as Temasek Holdings.
Foreign direct investment has been the main engine for stimulating economic
growth. Before the Asian currency crisis of 1997, foreign direct investment in the
manufacturing sector accounted for over 70 per cent of gross output, added value and
direct exports. Although the domestic ﬁnancial sector was under government
protection, foreign ﬁrms still accounted for over 20 per cent of shareholders’ equity,
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ﬁxed assets and equity investments. The state, together with domestic ﬁrms, has thus
become embedded in the wider international business context. Through this process
of globalization, the state was eager to maintain investor conﬁdence and strong
country credit ratings.
State–business relations
Singapore’s state bureaucracy is less autonomous from local private interests than
commonly thought. The state has been participating in production, and owns
extensive commercial assets through government-linked holdings and corporations.
Political leadership is entwined with leading ﬁgures from the private sector, to the
extent that the separation of public and private sectors is virtually indistinguishable
(Hamilton-Hart, 2002). For instance, several former civil servants and ministers have
served as former and current board chairs and board directors of the UOB and
OCBC. Despite increasing inﬂuence from the private sector, the state has continued
to co-opt, contain or suppress most challenges (Rodan, 1989). The private sector has
shown an amalgamation of interests with the governing elite and become embedded
in the formal institutions and values of working with, not against, the government.
The governing elite is less bureaucratic than commonly assumed, has few interests
vested in bureaucracy (Hamilton-Hart, 2002), and has demonstrated pragmatism and
ﬂexibility in steering institutional change (Shein, 1995).
Ownership and control in domestic ﬁrms
The majority of companies (including government-linked and family-controlled
enterprises) have a block shareholder holding an equity interest of 15 per cent or
more (Tan et al, 2006). These shareholders consist mainly of families, the
government (through government-controlled investment holdings) and, especially,
nominees. A clear separation between ownership and management is often lacking.
Given the lack of market discipline through the threat of listed ﬁrms being taken over
and the virtual absence of minority-shareholder activism, the state has been the
principal corporate governance watchdog for listed ﬁrms (Gourevitch and Shinn,
2005).
Penetration of the Anglo-American capital market logic
In 1997, the fall of the Thai baht triggered a regional ﬁnancial crisis. This weakened
the conﬁdence of foreign investors and led to an economic slowdown in the region.
Banks in Singapore were negatively affected by the devastated property sector,
economic slowdown and the political and economic transformation in South-East
Asian countries, as they were involved in webs of regional networks. After the crisis,
a growing number of International Monitory Fund (IMF) economists and consultants
Institutional change versus resilience
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(Economist Intelligence Unit and Andersen Consulting, 2000; Backman, 2001)
advised that Asian businesses seeking outside equity from Western institutional
investors would have to professionalize their governance structures. Table 2
summarizes the events and key actors shaping the corporate governance reforms.
The crisis gave impetus for the state to restructure its economy to become more
competitive in international ﬁnancial markets. It prompted the state to build up
Singapore as a global rather than simply regional ﬁnancial hub. Hsien Loong Lee,
then Deputy Prime Minister and Chairman of the MAS, said:
Singapore should aim to be a global rather than a regional ﬁnancial center… .
Ultimately, we aim to become a vibrant and dynamic global ﬁnancial hub
(Dow Jones International News, 3 April 2000).
To become a global ﬁnancial hub, it is crucial to attract foreign capital to the country.
For that to occur, institutional investors seeking ideal locations for their investments
must feel conﬁdence in regulatory standards, including those of corporate govern-
ance. For such investors, corporate governance is a set of mechanisms that function
to monitor management and reduce information asymmetry between management
and capital market participants.
As the small city-state’s economy has remained dependent on foreign investment
and the import of foreign talent, the state hardened its resolve to improve corporate








One-third of the board to be independent MOF, Corporate Governance
Committee
Absence of employment relationship in the
past 3 years
—





Rejection for the CCDG’s proposal to delink
independent directors from substantial
shareholders
MOF, Council on Corporate
Disclosure and Governance
Banking Act 2005 Majority of the board to be ‘independent from
management and business relationships
with the bank’
MAS
Majority of directors to be ‘independent
from any single substantial shareholder
of the bank’
—
Note: As stated in the codes and Banking Act 2005, a nominating committee can determine whether a
director who falls short of the deﬁnition can be treated as independent.
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governance. The second Minister for Finance, Hng Kiang Lim, and a Corporate
Governance Committee member, respectively, commented:
The lack of corporate governance impedes our aim of becoming an interna-
tional business and ﬁnancial hub. Hence more effort is required in improving
our corporate governance standard (Translated from Singapore’s Chinese
newspaper, LianHeZaoBao, 2000).
[It is] like competing in the Asian games. We are No.1, but in [the] Olympics,
we are nowhere… . Singapore is clearly ahead in the region in terms of [the]
regulatory framework [of corporate governance]. But I think, internationally,
we are behind [the] US, [the] UK, and Australia… .
The corporate governance standards demanded by global institutional investors have,
with state support, gradually penetrated the local context in Singapore.
The resilience of local relational logic
Although the state was interested in introducing Anglo-American capital market
logic as reﬂected in ‘market-oriented’ corporate governance practices, it needed
to take local relational logic into consideration. Historically, domestic banks in
Singapore have aimed to become strong banking institutions in the domestic and
regional markets. Hence, forming a relational network of experts in such markets
Table 3: The contending logics
Local market logic Anglo-American capital market
logic
Role of a ﬁrm To maximize beneﬁts for block
shareholders (controlling family or
the state)
To maximize proﬁt and
shareholder returns
Basis of strategy Build a relational network of experts
in local and regional markets to
achieve transaction efﬁciency
Attract investments to achieve
ﬁrm growth




Top managers and the Board
Sources of legitimacy Social/political capital to enhance
cooperation and efﬁcient
management to maximize ﬁrm
performance
Efﬁcient allocation of capital in
the market through stringent
governance rules on managerial




Control by block shareholders and
their appointees/insiders
Independent monitoring
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has been considered a strategic priority. A senior manager of the UOB defended
the policy of appointing board members with strong business and social ties in the
domestic and regional contexts:
We don’t have foreign [board directors]because we focus on Southeast Asia…
In fact, 70 per cent of the business is still in Singapore … We want to have
people [board directors] who understand the region.
Relational capitalism anchors in the culturally embedded view in which a ﬁrm
ultimately belongs to the founder and his or her family (Redding, 1990). Hence,
reliance on insiders and close associates to control and manage the ﬁrm is strong.
A business law academic remarked:
A lot of these companies [including the UOB and OCBC] have majority
shareholders who again are either families or, more importantly, who
are the ones who actually set up the companies and who want to retain
a certain degree of control. There’s this trust; you can’t expect them
to recognize [outside] directors overnight and then get a search com-
mittee to appoint someone that they don’t know at all to come onto their
board. For the majority shareholders, that’s quite scary … Board mem-
bers in Singapore are so familiar with one another, and the atmosphere
is so ‘cozy’, that honest feedback that could cause confrontation is most
unlikely.
Family-owned businesses often face the issue of reluctance to relinquish control to
outside directors because of a ‘strong sense of connectivity with the companies’,
according to a senior UOB manager we interviewed.
In the Singapore context, local ﬁrms have been embedded in relational norms
of trusting insiders (Low, 2001). Resistance to incorporating independent
directors onto boards and accepting their monitoring role has thus remained
strong among local ﬁrms. Essentially, recognizing the tensions between contend-
ing logics was critical for the state, because it was promoting Anglo-American
capital market logic on one hand, but its ﬁrms were embedded in the local
relational logic on the other.
The MOF’s response
To facilitate corporate governance reforms, the MOF, which oversees the corporate
sector, set up a Corporate Governance Committee in 1999. It was chaired by the
Chairman of a government-linked corporation, and seven of its eleven members were
from the corporate sector.
Many ﬁrms articulated concerns over the demand for domestic ﬁrms to
incorporate independent directors into their boards of directors. The issues included
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efﬁciency concerns and compatibility with the local relational logic, as shown in the
following:
Quite a number of ﬁrms were concerned with its impact on efﬁciency. With too
many voices, the company may not move as fast as it should… (extracted from
interview with a business law academic).
Someone who doesn’t know anyone [or] the business may be independent. But
can this person make [a] meaningful contribution? (extracted from interview
with an OCBC board director).
This director, in particular, believed that relying on insiders and their associates with
social and business ties is a more efﬁcient corporate governance approach than
appointing independent directors, as close personal connections facilitate collabora-
tion. This view reﬂects the entrenched relational capitalism in the domestic and
regional contexts.
The MOF, which regulates the corporate sector as a whole, was well aware of
the concerns of domestic ﬁrms. Although it attempted to improve the nation’s
corporate governance standards, it aimed to reduce disruptions to the business
operations of domestic ﬁrms, including its own stable of government-linked
corporations, which were run by a closely knit group of insiders (Tan et al,
2006). A MOF ofﬁcer stated:
They [Corporate Governance Committee members] were just looking at the
different codes out there and trying to ﬁnd, based on the developmental stage
of the SGX [Singapore Exchange], the listed companies, [and] the culture,
what… [the] companies [would be] comfortable with and [could] comply with
…. We are competing with all [of] these economies… even China. So we need
to have something that protects shareholders’ or investors’ interest[s]. At the
same time, [it is] still friendly to business. But all [of] these requirements add
cost[s]. So how are you going to strike the balance?
This statement suggests that the ofﬁcer did not see stringent governance rules as
conducive to efﬁcient business practices in the local context, but was aware of the
need to gain legitimacy in the eyes of global investors. To reconcile Anglo-
American capital market logic and local relational logic, the MOF would need to
strike a balance between demands for change and practical needs for continuity by
selectively modifying Anglo-American capital-market standards to ﬁt the local
context.
The Code of Corporate Governance adopted by the MOF in 2001 manifested its
intention to blend the competing logics. Unlike codes in Anglo-American markets,
which require at least 50 per cent of directors to be independent, Singapore’s
Code recommends that independent directors make up at least one-third of the
board. Further, whereas in the combined UK Code directors are deemed to
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be independent if they have had no employment relationships with a company for
the previous 5 years, Singapore’s Code requires the absence of an employment
relationship for the previous 3 years only. Furthermore, Singapore’s Code deems
directors not independent if they have received aggregate payments in excess of
S$200 000 in the current or past ﬁnancial year, whereas in the codes of many other
markets, independent directors must be free from any business relationship,
regardless of the amount of money paid. In other words, directors considered to
be non-independent in other markets can be regarded as independent in Singapore.
This makes it easier for domestic ﬁrms to comply with the Code, as the
independence criteria are less stringent.
In view of the trend of de-linking independent directors from substantial share-
holders in many economies, the Council on Corporate Disclosure and Governance,
established by the MOF in 2002 to review the existing corporate governance
framework for listed ﬁrms, made a proposal to adopt the same rule in Singapore.
The banks and other large ﬁrms, however, opposed this proposal (Tan et al, 2006).
For example, a board director of the UOB argued that the interests of the substantial
shareholder were aligned with those of the company:
Wee Cho Yaw [the largest shareholder, chairman, and former CEO of the
UOB] always says, I have a billion dollars in the bank. It’s my interest at stake.
You think I will make a fool of myself?
The new proposal was not well received by the MOF, which, according to
four academics and independent directors, has a vested interest in government-
linked corporations in which many of the board directors associated with
Temasek Holdings would be disqualiﬁed to serve on their boards. One of the
respondents said:
It [opposition to delinking independent directors from substantial shareholders]
came from the MOF and I understand that it’s mainly the group of government-
linked corporations under Temasek [Holdings]. Temasek [Holdings] has a lot
of substantial shareholdings in a lot of GLCs [which] appoint quite a number of
directors or appointees from Temasek into the boards.
The MOF eventually rejected the Council’s key recommendation of tightening the
deﬁnition of independent director. It reveals that the MOF accommodated the local
relational logic – which emphasizes relational ties and control by insiders – through
the deﬁnition of independent directors.
The MAS’s response
Despite the MOF’s objection, the MAS raised corporate governance standards in
order to maintain the conﬁdence of foreign investors in Singapore’s ﬁnancial
markets. As regulator of the nation’s ﬁnancial sector, it was mandated to uphold
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high standards. The managing director of the MAS made the following ofﬁcial
announcement on this matter:
The standards of corporate governance for banks and direct insurers
need to be higher than [those of] the other commercial entities to take
into account the unique roles they play in the ﬁnancial systems and the
economy (Siow, 2005; see also Business Times Singapore, 24 September
2006).
In contrast to the compromising attitude of the MOF, the MAS accepted the
Council’s proposal to de-link independent directors from substantial shareholders
and enacted it as a regulation rather than simply as recommended best practice.
As stated in the Banking Act, the new regulations (MAS, 2005, p. 12) requires ‘at
least a majority of directors who are independent [of] any single substantial
shareholder of the bank’. Instead of adopting the Corporate Governance Code
requirement that at least one-third of the board seats be ﬁlled by directors
independent from management or business relationships, the regulations raised the
requirement to ‘at least a majority’. The regulations also stipulate that at least one-
third of directors be free from management and business relationships and
independent of substantial shareholders. By adding these three requirements, the
new regulations represent a departure from the Corporate Governance Codes of 2001
and 2005. The regulations apparently countered the wishes of bank management by
imposing Anglo-American capital-market logic.
Yet, consistent with the governing elite’s willingness to seek a compromise
between conﬂicting institutional logics, the Banking Regulations, as with the
governance codes, allow the nominating committee to exercise residual power to
determine whether a director who falls short of meeting the deﬁnition is still
independent (MAS, 2005). This discretion allows room for banks to determine the
‘independence’ of their directors.
The banks’ responses
All three banks, which had signiﬁcant economic clout, were able to maintain their
inﬂuence on corporate governance reforms. The interaction between leading ﬁgures
in the banks and the MAS was frequent. Senior bank managers articulated their
doubts about the effectiveness of the Anglo-American style of independent monitor-
ing for their operations. A senior manager of the UOB and the former CEO of the
DBS said respectively:
[The] MAS meets with us monthly … We know them [MAS’s ofﬁcers] well.
We told them our concerns [over corporate governance issues]… Half of them
are scholars from foreign business schools, and ﬁrst year on the job… They are
scholars and go by the book. They have a checklist … and follow the most
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stringent rules … It’s like an academic exercise, and they have no idea of
implications.
Regulators should resist the pressure to airlift practices that work well in the
US but may not work here [in Singapore] (Yee, 2005).
Nevertheless, senior bank managers realized that any effort to resist Anglo-
American market logic would be futile. As the government removed the 40 per cent
foreign shareholding limit for local banks (Low, 2001), the banks have seen an
increase in foreign ownership. One of the senior bank managers from the UOB
explained:
We now have 40 per cent foreign shareholders…Most of them are institutional
investors … We have no choice … If you want to grow, you need foreign
investment. Corporate governance change is a natural development.
Yet it is beyond the banks’ comfort zone to adopt Anglo-American standards of
ﬁlling a majority of board seats with independent directors. We observe that all three
banks, regardless of their ownership and control structures, adopted similar
responses. First, their nominating committees effectively made use of the institu-
tional ambiguity in the rules by exercising discretion over the interpretation of the
independence of directors to achieve their goal of maintaining internal efﬁciency in
board decision making while gaining legitimacy from the ﬁnancial market. The
following statements published in the annual reports of the banks were used to justify
the independence of the directors not deemed independent by the Codes and Banking
Regulations:
Ms Goh and Mr Seah are also directors of companies linked to Temasek
Holdings, DBS’s substantial shareholder. As their appointments are non-
executive in nature and they are not involved in the day-to-day conduct of
these companies’ businesses, NC [Nominating Committee] has determined that
they are independent (DBS, 2010, p. 40).
The law ﬁrm of Mr Tan Kok Quan provided legal services to the UOB Group
in the past year. The NC [nominating committee] is of the view that Mr Tan’s
objectivity and independence have not been compromised by his ﬁrm’s
provision of services to the UOB Group (UOB annual report 2007, p. 37).
Second, while the banks incorporated a larger percentage of independent directors
on their boards, they were aware of the hidden tensions between the contending logics.
To circumvent potential conﬂicts, they skillfully exploited the multidimensionality of
the board role to maintain the existing function of the board. Outside board members
were valued for the ‘inputs’, ‘recommendations’ and ‘help’ that they could offer to
management. The nominating committee responsible for appointing directors empha-
sized the ability of potential independent members to provide such resources, while
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downplaying their monitoring role over management. Senior managers of the banks
expressed:
When a company becomes large, it needs a diversity of inputs … We need
directors in legal development, business development to guide management in
strategic directions…We also have lawyers on board.
We want to have information and [stay] ahead of the cycle [of an industry] so
that we can [assess] the risk when lending money to this sector. Otherwise, if
we start lending, some will be caught. We wanted to have representation [from]
a few key sectors to [assess] the risks…
Many independent directors also saw their main role as providing resources to
management and the company. For example, an independent director of the OCBC
and a member of the Singapore Institute of Director stated:
Financial performance is the responsibility of the management and the board.
It’s important to evaluate if an independent board member contributes
effectively to help the company.
For example, you want to expand to China to go into another line of business
… you take [an] independent [director] who has work experience in China
[onto] the [board]. Companies like DBS … are getting to a size where they
need a lot of people from outside [independent directors] to help them grow.
The resource-provision role of the board appears to have also been accepted by the
state. Then-acting Second Minister for Finance, Raymond Lim, commented:
With the globalization of competition, more companies will need to operate
across borders. Hence, companies will ﬁnd it useful to bring on board at least
one international non-executive director with the relevant skills and experience
(Lee, 2004).
In summary, as a response to the encroachment of Anglo-American market logic,
senior bank managers reinterpreted the role of independent directors in order to serve
their own interests. Despite such manipulation, investors did not show negative
reactions. A senior executive of the OCBC expressed:
How the board functions is different here. In the Singapore context, shareholders
are different. We don’t get law suits from shareholders like [those] in the US.
Discussion
In this study, we have examined how Anglo-American capital-market logic has
penetrated the local market of Singapore and how the domestic banks subsequently
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resolved tensions between the imported logic and the local relational logic in the ﬁeld
of corporate governance. Speciﬁcally, we have argued that the banks’ ability to
resolve the tensions was enhanced by the willingness of state agencies to modify
Anglo-American standards to ﬁt the local market. The MOF attempted to blend both
logics by modifying Anglo-American standards on the appointment of independent
directors to suit the local context. The MAS, however, applied largely Anglo-
American capital-market logic in regulating the corporate governance structures of
the banks. Yet it granted the banks residual power to exercise discretion over the
independence of outside directors.
In light of the institutional ambiguities in rules, local banks have exercised
discretion in justifying the appointment of directors not deemed independent by the
Codes and Banking Regulations, and have emphasized the resource-provision role of
board directors rather than their managerial-monitoring role. Through a reinterpreta-
tion of the meaning of independence and the function of independent directors, the
banks have been able to maintain the existing function of their boards, which reﬂects
the resilience of the local relational logic.
Contributions
Our study provides empirical analysis to help address the convergence–divergence
debate on institutional change. On the basis of the Singapore case, we agree with
Walter (2008) that it is important to identify the difference between formal regulatory
changes and actual governance practice and that substantive convergence to the
Anglo-American model of corporate governance has not taken place. Had we not
relied on a ﬁeld-research approach of studying organizational responses from key
players in corporate governance, however, we may have downplayed the gradual
but signiﬁcant institutional change, treating all signs of changes as superﬁcial
adjustments.
Rather, our data provides support for Streeck and Thelen’s (2005) argument for
gradual institutional change. As shown in our case study, state–business relations
and interactions between rule-makers and rule-takers were critical for the content
and development of the code of corporate governance and banking regulations,
and room was created to allow for strategic action on the part of the rule-takers.
The meaning of ‘independence’ of outside directors was not ﬁxed, and was subject
to interpretation and reinterpretation by bankers. The MOF’s application of
general Anglo-American standards to the Singapore context constituted a creative
act in which the unique economic development stage, cultural and regional
contexts were taken into consideration. The code of corporate governance, ﬁrst
enacted in 2000, varied with time and circumstances. More stringent requirements
were imposed in 2005 by MAS, which monitored the ﬁnancial sector, but allowed
ﬂexibility for rule-takers.
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The bankers largely complied with the code of corporate governance in terms of
board composition. As a banker of the UOB stated, the banks complied with the
requirement for an increase in the appointment of independent directors in light of the
rise in foreign shareholding. Given the insistence of MOF and MAS to model
practice after Anglo-American standards, and the willingness of the banks to comply,
we observe the signs of institutional change at least in the banking sector.
Nevertheless, the banks did not simply comply with the rules, but worked to
reinterpret the meaning of ‘independence’ by exploiting their inherent ambiguities
(Jackson, 2005) and under-deﬁnition. Given the limited pool of potential directors
and institutional embeddedness in trust in family and close relations, the incorpora-
tion of independent directors was seen as both costly and uncomfortable. Hence,
the bankers attempted to circumvent them by exploiting loopholes. Instead of
deﬁning ‘independence’ as being free from management, business and shareholding
relationships, they perceived it as reﬂecting an individual’s mindset, judgment and
personal integrity. Subsequently, they made use of residual power granted to justify
the appointment of those not deemed independent under the Codes and Banking
Regulations.
Furthermore, the bankers appear to have taken advantage of ‘institutional
ambiguity’ in rules by reinterpreting the institution of independent directors to
serve their own interests. This study reveals the creative way in which local actors
incorporated imported institutional logic by reinterpreting the new practice to
serve their own ends. As shown in the study, domestic banks in Singapore took
advantage of the multi-dimensionality of the role of independent directors when
they introduced such directors to their boards. They obviously focused on the
resource provision role and downplayed the managerial-monitoring role of
independent directors.
On the basis of the case shown, we argue for the coexistence of gradual
institutional change and institutional resilience, both being sustained by the interac-
tion between rule-makers and rule-takers. Streeck and Thelen’s (2005) ﬁve types of
gradual institutional change, which account only for change, are limited in explaining
the coexistence of change and continuity. The Singapore case shows no institutional
drift or exhaustion, leading to a breakdown in traditional institutions. On the one
hand, there emerged signs of displacement triggered by MAS, indicating a rise in
salience of Anglo-American standards at the expense of local traditional institutions.
On the other hand, there appeared to be signs of layering, which entailed the MOF’s
addition of selected Anglo-American rules to existing institutions, gradually leading
to a blending of foreign and local standards. Yet eventually the local institutions were
not defeated. The concept of institutional conversion can be applied, though with
modiﬁcations. Instead of reinterpreting the old institutions to serve the new purposes
toward institutional change, the Singapore bankers reinterpreted the new imported
institutions to serve their interests in protecting the existing logic in the institutional
change process.
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The ﬁndings of this study also have several implications for research on institutional
logic and comparative capitalism. The study shows the impact of contending Anglo-
American and local relational logics on an open economy and thereby provides
interesting insights for research into institutional change. We observed two logics,
characterizing them as Anglo-American and local relational logics (see Table 3). The
Anglo-American capital-market logic that the Singapore state agencies attempted to
promote is predicated on the view that the role of a ﬁrm is to maximize proﬁt and
shareholder returns (Weimer and Pape, 1999). A typical strategy is to attract
investments to boost ﬁrm growth, which is enhanced by an authority structure based
on top managers, the board of directors and public ownership of a listed ﬁrm. The
source of legitimacy stems from efﬁcient allocation of resources based on objective and
arm’s-length managerial monitoring and information transparency.
However, in the context of Singapore, the local institutions are network-oriented.
The salient stakeholders include mainly family shareholders and the government, but
exclude employees, unlike the stakeholder governance system in countries such as
Germany and Japan (Weimer and Pape, 1999). The role of a ﬁrm is to maximize
beneﬁts for block shareholders. The ﬁrm’s strategy is to build a relational network
of experts in local and regional markets to achieve transaction efﬁciency in the
local-regional markets. This logic emphasizes the view that relational ties and insider
control reduce transaction costs and hence improve efﬁciency. The apparent concern of
both logics with efﬁciency stands in contrast with many previous studies contrasting
institutional logics such as market logics versus non-market logics (Friedland and
Alford, 1991; Greenwood et al, 2010). We, however, have shown that both the Anglo-
American and local relational logics are concerned with transaction efﬁciency, but each
leads to different outcomes when it comes to the role of the board, consequently
leading to unique institutional change.
Our data support Redding’s argument (1990) that ethnic Chinese family businesses
are characterized by high levels of family control and a preference for ﬂexibility. They
are usually not coordinated through managerial hierarchies like those characterizing
Western or Japanese enterprises. A focus on personal connections and trust is witnessed
in the corporate governance system. Firms are seen as family property and instruments
of family enrichment. Top management posts and board posts are often reserved for
family members or personal associates who have established quasi-family connections
with family shareholders. Whereas Redding focused on overseas Chinese family
enterprises, as his data were collected largely from Hong Kong and Taiwan, our case
shows that some large enterprises are controlled by the government in Singapore.
Government-linked corporations are often managed by the closely-knit political elite
and the posts on boards and in top management teams ﬁlled by ex-civil servants (Low,
2001). The authority structure stems from family or state ownership and family and
political elite networks. The sources of legitimacy stem from social and political capital,
and governance mechanisms rely on control by large families and the government and
their appointees.
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Our ﬁndings also reveal that despite Singapore’s status as a developed economy,
market mode in the local context is still heavily inﬂuenced by relational logic, as
opposed to the arm’s-length and contract-based transaction mode (Peng, 2003). Yet,
given Singapore’s smaller domestic market size and hence heavy dependence on
foreign trade, capital and product/service markets, the Singapore state has had few
alternatives but to enhance its reputation in global capital markets and strengthen its
enforcement of corporate governance standards. The likelihood of corporate govern-
ance reforms to trigger a gradual move from a personalized relationship-based
structure, based on relational logic and network-centered strategy to an impersonal
exchange regime anchored in Anglo-American logic and a market-centered strategy,
as in Peng (2003), which remains to be investigated, is arguably higher than in
Taiwan, Hong Kong and Malaysia.
Implications for policy and practice
This study offers implications for policy makers. First, the introduction of
governance structures imported from institutional contexts that follow different institu-
tional logics may function as a signal to investors and other stakeholders. However,
such attempts may not lead to the outcomes that such practices are purported to achieve
unless the imported practices are modiﬁed to suit local contexts. Second, the state or its
agencies can play an important role as a facilitator or mediator to translate foreign
practices into locally acceptable ones. Indeed, this study shows that dialog between the
domestic banks and state agencies was critical in introducing the new board practices
into the Singapore context. Although local actors often resist any changes that cause
short-term disruptions, the state can play a role in striking a balance between
maintaining some level of stability and setting new directions of institutional change.
With respect to local ﬁrms, the existence of contending logics is likely to pose a
challenge. as the new structures may not only incur costs but also hinder their
objectives. Although foreign institutional investors are likely to appreciate the
incorporation of independent directors on to the board, local investors – including
members of the founding family, who are more attuned to local relational logic –may
be indifferent or even opposed to such structures because of the costs involved and
the lack of evidence that those structures would be effective in the local context. In
such a situation, local actors are more likely to engage in reinterpretation of imported
logic to ﬁt their own interests.
Future research directions
This study has speciﬁcally focused on Singapore because it is an ideal context to
explore the complex interactions of the Anglo-American capital market and local
relational logics and the actions of key players in an economy. We believe our study
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has implications for a number of Asian and other emerging economies that have a
strong legacy of state intervention and high dependence on foreign investments
(Carney and Witt, 2014). Future research on different institutional contexts in which
competing Anglo-American and local relational logics coexist would further enhance
our understanding of how local actors respond to competing logics.
This qualitative study, covering both government-linked and family-controlled
enterprises, can also provide a reference to research into such enterprises, which are
prevalent in China and economies dominated by ethnic Chinese capital. In addition,
researchers can conduct large-scale empirical studies to examine how ﬁrms in different
industries in individual economies react to competing institutional logics. In less-
regulated industries with a diversity of ﬁrms having different ﬁeld positions and
ownership and control structures, ﬁrms may have more discretion to choose their actions.
Thus, more variance in practices and their underlying conditions can be identiﬁed.
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